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Governments, economists and intellectuals have called for common European
bonds or increased own EU funds to address the recession induced by Covid19.
Unfortunately, the German government, joined by the other members of the “Frugal
Four” (Austria, Finland, the Netherlands), has categorically rejected to look into
any such measures and favours using the ESM. This reaction created a déjà vu
experience for citizens and governments of the heavily affected southern Member
States of the EU. The proposal to use the ESM raises fears of another wave of
austerity amounting to yet another lost decade for economic, social, and ecological
development in Europe.
Meanwhile, however, even some members of the Christian Democrats raise
doubts about the strategy of their leaders. The understanding that the Corona
crisis combines multiple risks, including financial instability, migration, and
authoritarianism, seems to gain ground. Consequently, any response will require
greater European solidarity, which has been fundamentally absent. When the
Eurogroup meets on Tuesday, April 7, it will be decided whether the idea of Corona
bonds will be consigned to the scrap heap of history. Should Europe continue on
the path of austerity, the European Union will have to ask itself to what extent it still
contributes to “Europe as a Way of Life”, as Tony Judt famously called the postwar
European welfare state model.  
To facilitate this deliberation, it is therefore high time to submit a concrete proposal
for the practical realization of Corona bonds. The purpose of this contribution is
to set out a number of principles that might serve as a blueprint for the European
institutions. In light of the urgency of the situation, the proposal sketches out the
main issues only. 
Purpose and Use of Proceeds of Corona Bonds
It is therefore of crucial importance that Corona Bonds are beneficial for all Member
States. The purpose is not an act of charity for the weaker, but of protecting the
common European project against a challenge that affects all through fault of none.
The purpose is to ensure that Europe as a whole emerges from this unexpected
crisis stronger and readier to meet the many other challenges which have been
temporarily been put on the back burner, but which remain unresolved. One part of
the financing volume should therefore serve common European projects involving
all Member States that provide effective relief to Europe’s most urgent crises. The
other part should be made available to individual Member States on the basis of a
common programmatic framework. 
Possible common European projects could include: (1) Health: Gearing up pandemic
response in Europe; establishing a network for the production, storage, and
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distribution of essential equipment; Investments in research, specifically in the fields
of public health and medicine. Building European competence centres where there
are none. (2) Digitalization: Enhancing Europe’s digital infrastructure; seed money
for start-ups. (3) Migration: Common asylum application processing, accommodation
and provisioning of refugees and migrants in full compliance with fundamental rights.
(4) Rule of Law: Investments in strictly independent public broadcast networks,
preferably European ones. (5) Climate: Fund ecological investments, improve
the European railroad infrastructure, reconsider privatization where appropriate,
revisit the regulation of public utilities, invest in research and development, invest in
renewable energy, including the local production of crucial components. 
Financing lines for individual member states could include: (1) Healthcare:
Investments in hospital infrastructure and the training of doctors and nurses; (2)
Labour and Industry: investments in reindustrialization strategies, also with a view
to re-Europeanize crucial parts of value chains; European wage guarantee funds
(already proposed by v.d. Leyen); survival fund for small businesses (e.g. in the
tourism sector); qualification measures, survival fund for crucial infrastructure (e.g.
airports and airlines).
Volume and Maturities of the Corona Bonds
Economists have proposed a volume of EUR 1,000 bn (one trillion). The maturities
should overall be long given the long-term character of most of the financed
projects. 
Principal and Interest Repayments
Each Member State would be responsible for a share of the principal and interest
repayments of the Corona Bonds in accordance with the key for GDP-based
contributions to the EU budget.  Each Member State would fund these payments
from its tax revenue.  Special tax revenue specifically earmarked for debt service of
these Bonds could also be raised on a EU-wide basis through common taxes (on
the basis of Art. 115 AEUV or on a separate treaty basis), e.g. financial transaction
taxes, air traffic taxes, CO2 taxes, a common digital tax, etc.
The obligation of each Member State to make its contribution to the debt service of
the Corona Bonds should be expressly made a prior obligation of that Member State.
  This means that the Member State would have to allocate the relevant proportion
from its tax revenues and transfer it to the entity issuing the Corona Bonds in priority
to other budget obligations.  In practice, a mechanism of this sort would provide for
the debt service to be made on a several basis, thereby minimising concerns for
unnecessary cross-subsidies between Member States.  Nonetheless, the obligations
of the entity issuing the Corona Bonds should be joint and several to ensure that
these Bonds have the highest possible rating and to signal to the markets that
Europe stands together.  
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GDP-Indexing
It may be appropriate that at least some of these bonds be GDP linked which
will make interest rate and principal payments dependent on the future economic
development. This will have two benefits. First, it will provide fiscal space and avoid
pro-cyclical effects for the budgets of the Member States. Second, it will make all
Member States (and their taxpayers who support them) investors who have an
interest in the future prosperity of Europe as a whole.  
Collateral Benefits
One side-effect of the bonds would be the much-requested creation of a safe asset
for institutional and retail investors alike.
The Institutional Framework
The long-term character of most projects requires a long lifespan of the entity issuing
the Corona Bonds. Using the EU directly would likely overstretch the competencies
of the EU under Article 122 TFEU.  One might overcome this problem by using
Article 352 para. 1 TFEU (as in case of the 1975 community bonds established
by regulation 397/75). However, this avenue requires unanimity and may allow
certain Member States to block measures introduced to defend the values of the EU
stipulated in Article 2 TEU. Also, to be a credible counterparty, the EU would have to
have considerable own rights of taxation, a development which is unlikely to occur
soon. And one might doubt whether domestic constitutional courts would accept
handing enormous fiscal powers to the Union without a profound refurbishment of its
institutional framework.
While we understand that using the ESM as an existing institution is attractive to
many decision-makers and would come with a low legal risk from the perspective
of the European treaties, the purpose of the proposed Corona Bonds shows that
the ESM under its current form would  not be an adequate vehicle. It is structured
for individual countries in distress, i.e. for asymmetric shocks, and it requires “strict
conditionality” according to Art. 3 ESM Treaty and Art. 136(3) TFEU. It is true that
the European Court of Justice has in the past shown flexibility in adjusting similarly
strict provisions to changed circumstances. However, the ESM has been established
as a rescue mechanism for individual member states in distress.  It has not been
established to promote common European projects, which is the purpose of the
Corona bonds. 
Another major drawback of the ESM is that funding lines for individual Member
States increase those Member States’ level of indebtedness. This might worsen,
rather than improve, those members’ funding situation.
Moreover, not all member states are members of the ESM. The Corona crisis and
associated recession is, however, a problem affecting the entire Union. The ESM
should not be transformed into a Corona vehicle as it continues to play a role as a
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backstop for the European Monetary Union (EMU). There is little point in involving
non-Eurozone countries in this business by making them ESM members. 
Nonetheless, the establishment of the ESM could inform the current process.  It
was preceded by the EFSF, used a private-law entity governed by Luxembourg law,
given the urgency and the time required to set up a new treaty entity. On balance,
a public law vehicle, if properly designed, seems preferable as it comes with the
necessary guarantees for ensuring democratic legitimacy, judicial review, and
fundamental and human rights. Therefore, a new international Corona Bond Treaty
(CBT) open to all EU Member States, which are prepared to accept its goals, modes
of operation and values, lends itself as an adequate, pragmatic way forward.  
Although immediate action is required, there is still sufficient time and a wealth of
experience to enable Europe to establish the CBT as a new entity outside of the
Treaties. As the financial implications of almost any European funding scheme
would require the consent of Member State parliaments, the timing would allow for
the simultaneous adoption and ratification of a treaty. There is no need to build up
a new institution, as the administration of the CBT could be delegated to existing
institutions. Both the Commission and the ESM have the experience required for
issuing and managing bonds. Disbursement and monitoring of funds could be
delegated to the Commission. From a legal point of view, such delegations seems
unproblematic. It should be extended to the European Parliament and the Court
of Justice to ensure strong political and legal accountability. Careful thought would
need to be given to ensure that, as a matter of institutional design, the EU institutions
acting under this Treaty are indeed suitably accountable.
The Member States would have to extend financial guarantees for the CBT. The
guarantees of each Member State could be restricted to their share in the fund in
accordance with the key for GNI based contributions or any other repartition scheme.
The Rule of Law Crisis
The extraordinary measures that European governments are taking in relation to
the pandemic are challenging our concepts of openness, democratic accountability
and the rule of law.  Governments tread a course which most acknowledge to be
difficult.  It will be important to ensure that the functioning of the CBT promotes the
fundamental values of the EU and does not assist governments which fail to meet
these values.  Appropriate provisions setting standards for these values should be
included in the CBT. States willing to be CBT members should be able to comply
with these standards. One option would be to use simple majorities wherever
possible.
Article 125 TFEU: No-Bailout and Moral Hazard
Any proposal to structure common-bond issuances in Europe must consider
Article 125 TFEU, the famous “no-bailout” provision. Wherever else this Article may
apply, it does not apply to Corona bonds. Its purpose is to prevent a bail-out, i.e. the
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mutualisation of the debt of one or more Member States. Corona bonds are mutual
debts from the very beginning, and their mutual character is not just a formality as
they are supposed to fund common European projects with some of the revenue. In
this regard, Corona bonds differ significantly from Eurobond proposals, which are
meant to contribute directly to each Member State’s own budget. Even to the extent
that the proceeds from Corona bonds are used for the benefit of individual Member
States, this will still occur within the frame of common European projects. In fact,
Article 125 para. 1 TFEU states that its provisions are “without prejudice to mutual
financial guarantees for the joint execution of a specific project.”
Even if Article 125 TFEU applied to the CBT, the Court of Justice established in
Pringle that this treaty provision has the purpose to ensure Member States follow a
path of stability. It would be precisely the purpose of a CBT to bring member states
back on a path of economic and financial stability. Moreover, given the program
character of CBT, which should not be confused with regular conditionalities, the
nature and purpose of the CBT does not raise a risk of moral hazard.
Constitutional Issues
The CBT might raise constitutional issues in many member states which are too
many to be covered here. This part is therefore limited to possible objections from
Karlsruhe, the court most critical of financial risks accruing from EU membership. In
its ESM judgment, the BVerfG has established an array of conditions which need
to be respected to guarantee the budget autonomy of the Bundestag, a feature that
partakes in Germany’s constitutional identity. One of these conditions is a cap on the
overall financial risk, which the CBT meets (EUR 1,000 bn). The overall share of the
debt to be guaranteed by Germany should not exceed constitutional limits. Given
that the entire or most of the EU-27 would likely participate in a CBT, Germany’s
share of the burden would not be much larger than its stake in the ESM if measured
in absolute numbers. 
To the extent that CBT would not be financed through specific taxes, the members
would have to pay contributions in accordance with their share of the GNI
contributions to the EU budget. While these regular contributions would be
small enough not raise any constitutional difficulties, things are different for the
question what should happen with the funds. Even though usage of the funds is
not asymmetric as in case of the ESM, it does not seem unlikely that the BVerfG
would insist on a role for the Bundestag in the design of the CBT. CBT would yield
considerable fiscal power after all. It is also unsure whether the BVerfG would allow
the CBT to compensate for the loss of influence of national parliaments by giving
the European Parliament a much stronger role than it plays in the frame of the ESM,
including the right to approve the annual CBT budget. One might be hopeful in this
regard, as the 2019 Banking Union judgment of the BVerfG positively recognizes the
role of the European Parliament in the Banking Dialogue. Nevertheless, foundational
financial decisions, including the adoption or modification of project lines, might still
require the consent of the Bundestag. For this reason, a possible CBT would require
unanimity for key financial decisions, both on the asset and on the liability side of its
balance sheet. 
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Conclusion
Corona bonds are needed to preserve the European project, and they are feasible.
They can be issued through a new public law entity and include all the safeguards
required for the protection of the fundamental values of the EU. Not all of the
undersigned support all points of this proposal equally. Not all points of the proposal
might attract high praise from the point of view of constitutional theory. From this
perspective, they raise issues that, with time, will need to be carefully considered.
But this proposal is a pragmatic one to facilitate the choice European leaders
now have to make: to finally show some resolve and to unite in the midst of a
divided world, or to retreat along ill-perceived national lines. The political risks are
significantly higher now than in 2010. The gargantuan challenge of tackling the
combined impact of climate change, migration, digitalization, geopolitical shifts, and
the spread of autocracy, requires leadership in deeds.  This may be the last real
chance for the Council and the Eurogroup to show leadership and statesmanship.
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